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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 950077-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No.

JARED C. KACSUTA,

2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JTTRISDICTJON AND flAT?RE QF PEQCEEDINSS

This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) ,
-8(5) (a) (ix) and (x), -8(5) (c) (Supp. 1995), in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, in and for Beaver County, the Honorable
J. Philip Eves, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did defendant's trial counsel render effective

assistance of counsel?

Whether a defendant has received

ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed as a question of
law when raised for the first time on direct review, State v.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993); however, "appellate
review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential."

Id.

at 466.
2.

Did the trial court correctly find that testimony

concerning defendant's prior drug distribution activities was
admissible for the limited purpose of showing his intent on the
evening of his arrest?

u

The admission of evidence under Rule

404 is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness."
1994).

n

State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App.

*However, the trial court's subsidiary factual

determinations should be given deference by the appellate court
and only be overruled if they are clearly erroneous."' Id.
(quoting State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Utah App. 1993),
pert, (tenied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993)).
3.

Should the Court consider defendant's claim that there

was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict when he
failed to marshal the evidence?

Failure to marshal the evidence

waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency
considered on appeal.

State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l

(Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
4.

Should this Court consider defendant's claim that the

trial court erroneously denied his motion to reduce his sentence?
The appellate court will assume the correctness of a lower court
ruling in the absence of any meaningful record.

State v. Garza.

820 P.2d 937, 938-39 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertinent to
the determination of the issues on appeal are attached at
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute (Count I ) , a second degree
felony, and possession of a controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor (R. 1-2). Defendant moved to suppress evidence (R.
81-82; T. 56). Following a jury trial, on June 22, 1994,
2

defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute (T. 170). The trial court sentenced
defendant to a term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison (R. 153).
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
At the time of his arrest, defendant was under the parole
supervision of Rodney E. Seymour of Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P) (T. 68-69) . Defendant had not reported as required to
Officer Seymour for approximately a month and a half despite
several messages being left at defendant's residence (T. 69). On
March 17, 1994, Officer Seymour and another AP&P agent went to
Beaver "with the specific reason to arrest Jared Kacsuta for a
parole violation" (T. 70).
The officers arrived at defendant's apartment, located
across the street from the high school, about 5:20 in the evening
(T. 70) -1 They knocked on defendant's door, identified
themselves and said they wanted to talk to defendant (T. 70-71) .
Defendant opened the door and Officer Seymour stepped into the
apartment (T. 71). There they discovered six other young men,
four of whom were juveniles, and defendant's brother, Jason
Kacsuta, all grouped closely together (T. 71, 122).
Officer Seymour conducted a pat-down search of defendant and
found in defendant's pockets $58 and three baggies of marijuana,
containing 5.2 grams, 2.8 grams and 0.4 grams, respectively,
enough to make about thirty-three marijuana cigarettes (T. 72,

1

Additional testimony established that the corner of the
high school was 277 feet from defendant's apartment (T. 99).
3

74, 83, 86). Defendant was arrested, handcuffed and transported
to the Beaver County Sheriff's Office (T. 72-75).
Officer Seymour informed the Sheriff's Office that they had
found the marijuana on defendant and that there had been
juveniles in the apartment at the time of the arrest (T. 94).
Officer Russell Erickson of the Beaver City Police Department was
aware of an outstanding arrest warrant for defendant's brother
Jason Kacsuta (T. 94). Officer Erickson and Officer Cameron Noel
went to defendant's apartment to arrest defendant's brother (T.
94).

Officer Noel noticed a lot of tobacco smoke and open

containers of alcohol, and believed he smelled stale marijuana
smoke (T. 109-110).

Officers Erickson and Noel ordered all of

the juveniles out of the apartment, locked the apartment and
transported defendant's brother back to the police station (T.
95).

In transit the officers talked with Jason and became

suspicious that there were other controlled substances in the
apartment (T. 94-95).
Back at the Sheriff's Office, Officer Erickson asked for and
received defendant's permission to search the apartment (T. 96).
Defendant signed a "Permission to Search" form (T. 96). The
apartment was then searched and various items of drug
paraphernalia were found including a pocket knife with marijuana
residue, a marijuana pipe, marijuana seeds and stems, pipe
screens, scales and a roach clip (T. 96).
Officer Erickson, trained at the police academy on visual
identification of marijuana, testified that in his experience the
scales found in defendant's apartment would most commonly belong
to the seller, rather than the buyer of drugs, and that, because
all the paraphernalia was found in a bag in defendant's closet,
4

he did not think the paraphernalia belonged to one of defendant's
visitors (T. 96-98, 104-105).
Ronald James, defendant's landlord, testified that he was
having trouble with defendant's having too many people in the
apartment (T. 89, 91). Jason Greenwood, one of defendant's
neighbors, had complained several times to James about many
people coming and going from defendant's apartment at all hours
of the night (T. 115-17).

Within a month before defendant's

arrest Greenwood could smell marijuana in the stairwells and the
halls:

"Sometimes it would come through the vents, and you could

smell it. Anytime you walked up the stairs . . . you could smell
it as you walked up" (T. 118).
Prior to trial, the court conducted a suppression hearing
concerning the admissibility of three State witnesses who would
testify that they used or purchased marijuana from the defendant
before his arrest (T. 3 9-57).

After extensive argument, the

court allowed the testimony as evidence of defendant's intent to
distribute under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 56).
At trial the court gave an extensive cautionary instruction
to the jury that the testimony from the three witnesses pertained
only to defendant's intent, and was not relevant for any other
purpose (T. 123). The first witness was Cody Beaumont, a
seventeen-year-old, who was present when defendant was arrested
(T. 120-21).

He testified that one week prior to defendant's

arrest defendant had given him marijuana and they had smoked it
in Cody's truck (T. 124). Cody further testified that defendant
had "occasionally" given him marijuana prior to defendant's
arrest (T. 124). The second witness, Jerry Perez testified that
he and defendant had smoked marijuana at Mr. Perez's house (T.
5

128).

Mr. Perez further testified that in the beginning of March

he and defendant had smoked defendant's marijuana at work (T.
130).

The third witness, Scott Clemmons, testified that at the

beginning of February he purchased $3 0 or $4 0 of marijuana from
the defendant (T. 132-33).
The State's final witness was Raymond Goodwin, a twenty-year
veteran Utah police officer in the Beaver County Sheriff's Office
with specialized training in the trafficking of controlled
substances.

He testified that the presence of three baggies of

marijuana on defendant indicated drug trafficking (T. 135-36).
He also stated that it is common to find drug distributors with
scales, which usually belong to the seller rather than the buyer
(T. 140). He concluded that all the evidence presented was
characteristic of drug distribution (T. 141).
Defendant called no witnesses.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant's fails to show through his multifarious claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel that his counsel acted
deficiently or that he was prejudiced.

Defendant supplies no

record evidence that witnesses he claims his counsel should have
called to testify would have aided his case or that counsel did
not deliberately reject them.

Defendant's challenge to counsel's

refusal to object to the admission of drug paraphernalia and an
officer's opinion about marijauna residue on the paraphernalia
fails because of the officer's expertise and the undemanding
standard required to authenticate evidence.

Defendant fails to

show either deficient performance or prejudice in his counsel's
refusal to object to a perfectly adequate cautionary instruction
6

or adequate instructions on *intent."

Finally, defendant fails

to show that his counsel's choice not to request a lesser
included offense instruction on attempted possession with intent
to distribute was anything other than legitimate trial strategy.
PQINT II
The trial court correctly admitted testimony of defendant's
prior uncharged drug dealing.

The evidence was offered only to

show defendant's intent to distribute marijuana on the evening of
his arrest and was highly probative based on the similarity and
recency of the prior acts.

The evidence was also necessary to

the State's case which was circumstantial and lacked any direct
evidence of defendant's having actually distributed marijuana on
the evening in question.

While defendant has apparently

abandoned a challenge to the trial court's overall weighing of
probative value against unfair prejudice under rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, such a weighing favors admissibility based on
the strength of the prior act evidence, the recency of the prior
acts, and the probability that the jury would not be roused to
"overmastering hostility" by reference to single instances of
drug dealing.

Finally, the trial court gave an instruction,

clearly directing the jury on the limited use of the testimony.
POINT III
Because defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support
of the jury's verdict, the Court should not consider his
insufficiency of evidence claim.
POINT IV
Because defendant fails to supply the Court with a
transcript or any record evidence bearing on the trial court's
denial of his motion to reduce sentence, the Court must assume
7

that the lower court acted correctly and decline to consider the
claim on appeal.
£RGV*P5NT
POJNT I
THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT DEPENDANT'S
NUMEROUS CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
A.

The frfrw

In considering an ineffectiveness of counsel claim raised
for the first time on direct appeal, the standard of review
applied by* the appellate court is "whether defendant was deprived
of effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law."
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993).

State v.

However, even

though the Court applies this usually nondeferential standard,
"appellate review of counselfs performance must be highly
deferential" to minimize the "temptation . . . to second-guess
counsel's performance" in hindsight, "on the basis of an
inanimate record."

Id. at 466.

Since ineffectiveness challenges normally cannot be raised
on direct appeal, State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah
App. 1993), aff'd. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995), the Court is
presented with the threshold question whether it can hear
defendant's claim on this point.

An appellant may bring an

ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if there is new counsel on
appeal and "the trial record is adequate to permit determination
of the issue."

Id. at 953; State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027,

1029 (Utah 1991).

A record is adequate when " [the appellate

court is] not aware of any evidence or argument which might be
made that is not now before [the court]."

8

Id. at 1029.

Defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal.

However, the

record is adequate to evaluate only some of defendant's claims.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions which, under
the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that
""counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.'"

State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah

1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

Second, defendant must establish the

prejudice prong by "affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the
result would have been different."
909, 913 (Utah 1988).

State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d

"Defendant has the burden of demonstrating

that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions
were not conscious trial strategy."

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d

170, 174 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant's burden is heavy:
In proving the first prong of the Strickland
test, the defendant must point to specific
instances in the record where counsel's
assistance was inadequate. Strickland. 466
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so
doing, the defendant must overcome "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.
Ct. at 2065. "This court will not
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
strategic choices, however flawed those
choices might appear in retrospect."
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v.
Pascual. 804 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 1991)).
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994).
9

B.

Defendants Claims are Completely Without
Either Factual or Legal Support

1.

Witnesses Defendant Claims Should have Been Called

Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing
to call as witnesses (1) Matt Mandera, (2) defendant's alleged
employer or work associate and (3) those present at defendant's
arrest.

Appellant's Br. at 12-13, 16-17.

However, since

defendant did not move for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,2 wherein defendant
might have established why counsel did not call certain witnesses
or what their testimony might have been, there exists no record
upon which this Court can assess counsel's actions.

*[The

appellate court] may consider an ineffective assistance claim
only if the record is adequate to permit a decision."

State v.

Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d
943 (Utah 1993).

See Strain. 885 P.2d at 818 ("Counsel might

have validly determined that trial preparation time would be
better spent on other avenues more likely to assist defendant.").
Therefore, the Court cannot address defendant's claims concerning
counsel's failure to call prospective witnesses.

2

Rule 23B is expressly intended to remedy deficiencies in
the record related to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an
appeal in a criminal case may move the court
to remand the case to the trial court for the
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant
to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The motion shall be available only
upon an allegation of facts constituting
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully
appearing in the record on appeal. . . .
Utah R. App. P. 23B.
10

2.

Non-objection to paraphernalia

Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing
to object on grounds of relevance and foundation to the
introduction of the paraphernalia found in his apartment.
Appellant's Br. at 11-12.
"'Decisions as . . . to what objections to make . . . are
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel.'"

State

v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
Rules 401 and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, collectively
provide for the admission of "all evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."

Plainly, the discovery of

paraphernalia in a bag in a closet in defendant's apartment (T.
96-98) is relevant to a drug distribution charge.

Defendant's

challenge on foundational grounds is similarly hollow.

There is

no dispute about where the paraphernalia was found, and Officer
Erickson testified, without significant challenge, that he did
not think that the paraphernalia belonged to anyone other than
defendant because a visitor would not have hidden those items in
defendant's closet (T. 105-06).
3.

Non-objection to marijuana residue

Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective in failing
to object to testimony that marijuana residue was found on a
knife and the bowl of a marijuana pipe because there was
inadequate foundation laid.

Appellant's Br. at 13.

Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:

"The

requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
11

support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims."
hurdle."

"The rule does not erect a particularly high

United States v. Ortiz. 966 F.2d 707, 716 (1st Cir.

1992), cert, denied, Ortiz v. United States. 506 U.S. 1063,
S. Ct. 1005 (1993) .3

113

"The rule requires only that the court

admit evidence if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a
reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or
identification.

The rest is up to the jury."

5 Jack B.

Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinsteinfs Evidence § 901(a) [01]
at 901-19 (1994).
Officer Ericksen testified to having received training in
drug violations and specialized training in visually identifying
marijuana at the police academy (T. 94, 97). That was sufficient
foundation for the admission for the officer's testimony that it
was marijuana residue that he found on the pipe bowl and knife.
State v. Wiley. 614 So.2d 862, 870 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (police
officer's visual identification of cocaine sufficient foundation
for admission of evidence).

Even if it was error to admit

Officer Erickson's testimony, it was harmless considering that a
marijuana pipe, whose identification and admission as such is
nowhere challenged, would naturally be stained with the residue
of the material it was designed to contain.

For this reason

counsel might have considered an objection pointless.

See State

v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (finding reasonable
counsel's strategic decision not to try to exclude conceivably

3

Rule 901 is virtually identical to the rule 901, Federal
Rules of Evidence, from which it is plainly derived.
12

inadmissible child testimony considering that court had made
reliability findings), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1,990).
4.

Lack of Written Cautionary Instruction

Prior to trial defendant moved to exclude the testimony of
three witnesses who had variously smoked and purchased marijuana
from defendant on prior occasions (R. 50-51; T. 39-56).

The

trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence, offered
to prove defendant's intent to distribute at the time of his
arrest, was more probative than prejudicial (T. 56). 4
Recognizing, however, that there was a clear danger of prejudice,
the trial ruled that it would caution the jury that the evidence
was to be considered only on the issue of defendant's intent at
the time of his arrest and that it would be improper to convict
him because of any prior uncharged criminal conduct (T. 56).
When Cody Beaumont, the first of the State's witnesses to
testify that defendant had previously provided him with
marijuana, was asked about his prior connections with defendant,
the trial court cautioned the jury from the bench:
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and Gentleman,
you're going to be receiving some information
during this trial relating to prior acts of
distribution of controlled substances by the
defendant. You are instructed that that
information is only relevant and is only
being admitted in this case on the issue of
the defendant's intent with regard to the
marijuana that was found in his pocket as
testified to by Mr. Seymour on March 17,
1994. You're not to use that information or
consider that evidence in regard to any other
aspect of the case.

4

Defendant's challenge to the substance of the trial court's
ruling is discussed below. See Appellee's Br. at Point II.
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You may not find the defendant, Jared
Kacsuta, guilty of the offenses charged in
this case based solely on the evidence that
he may have distributed marijuana in the
past. The State must proof [sic] beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant intended
to distribute the marijuana he possessed, if
any, on March 17th, 1994. Evidence
indicating that he engaged in such conduct on
some other occasion may be considered by you
as evidence of his intent on March 17th,
1994; however, you may not enter a guilty
verdict in this case if the State fails to
prove the elements of the offense or offenses
charged even if you believe that he may have
committed a similar crime in the past.
(T. 123). With that cautionary instruction, the jury heard Cody
Beaumont, Jerry Perez and Scott Clemmons testify about
defendant's having previously supplied them with marijuana (T.
120-134).
On appeal, defendant argues, without citation to any legal
authority, that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to the court's instruction, allegedly deficient because it (1)
was oral instead of written (2) did not clearly identify which
witnesses it applied to, (3) should have been more complete and
definitive about how the jury should treat the testimony, (4) did
not state that past possession of marijuana did not indicate
future intent to distribute, (5) did not also state that
defendant has a presumption of innocence and (6) the instruction
was ambiguous about what the court meant by testimony of
defendant's intent.

Appellant's Br. at 14-15.

Addressing defendant's claims in serial fashion: (1)
defendant provides no authority for the view that a cautionary
instruction is inadequate because it is given orally, rather than
in written form.

State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah

App.) (refusing to consider arguments unsupported by legal
14

analysis or authority, citing State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,
1344 (Utah 1984)), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); (2)
the instruction and the context in which it was requested
obviously refer to witnesses that are just about to testify, and
the jury could not have been misled that the instruction applied
to all three juveniles called since their testimony went only to
their prior drug dealings with defendant; (3) defendant fails to
show how the instruction, plain and simple, was incomplete, thus
failing on the second prong of Strickland, at the very least; (4)
defendant's request that the instruction state that past
possession of drugs does not bear on future intent to distribute,
i.e., that the instruction was irrelevant, is vacuous; (5)
defendant provides no legal support for the view that a
contemporaneous instruction on the presumption of innocence be
given, Amicone. 684 P.2d at 1344, and fails to show prejudice
since the trial court gave a written instruction specifically
directed to the presumption of innocence (R. 106); and (6)
defendant fails to discuss in any meaningful way how the jury
could have been confused about "intent," a term of common usage,
particularly in view of the prosecution's having focussed the
jury on that issue in opening argument (T. 62). In sum,
defendant's claims are without merit.
5.

Intent Jury Instruction

Defendant claims his trial counsel should have requested an
instruction on "intent to distribute," rather than accepting the
court's instruction using the general definition of "intent."

He

apparently argues that this error was compounded by the court's
failure to distinguish in its cautionary instruction whether it

15

was concerned with the intent to possess as opposed to the intent
to distribute.

Appellant's Br. at 15-16.

Defendant's claim that the jury would have been incapable of
applying a general definition of intent to the issue of *intent
to distribute," or that the instructions given were inadequate,
is unsupported by any clear legal analysis or authority, and
should be rejected on that account.

Amicone. 684 P.2d at 1344.

Moreover, defendant's claim is patently without merit considering
the specificity of the instructions.5

Further, the jury's

finding defendant guilty of possession with intent to distribute
and acquitting him on the straight possession charge demonstrates
its ability to discriminate between the intent to distribute and
the intent to merely possess.
6.

Lesser Included Offense Instruction

Defendant argues that because there was no evidence that he
actually distributed marijuana on March 17, 1994, his counsel was
ineffective in failing to request a lesser included offense
instruction on attempted possession with intent to distribute.
Appellant's Br. at 17-18.

This claim too fails.

Defendant acknowledges that "it is not clear in the record
whether [counsel's failure to request the instruction he argues
for on appeal] was in fact decided upon as part of Defense's
trial strategy."

Appellant's Br. at 18. The court gave an

instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of
marijuana, a class A misdemeanor.

5

Attempted possession with

Jury instructions on "intent" and definitions of
"intentionally," "possession," "distribute" and "distributor"
(Jury Instructions #12, #13 and #14, R. 115-118) are attached at
Addendum B.
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intent to distribute is a third degree felony.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 76-4-102(3) (1995) ("Criminal attempt to commit . . . a
felony of the second degree is a third degree felony").
Considering that there was no evidence that defendant actually
distributed marijuana on the date of his arrest, counsel might
very well have thought that defendant stood a better chance of
being convicted of simple possession, an offense carrying a
lesser penalty than attempted possession with intent.

Indeed,

counsel practically invited the jury to convict on the simple
possession charge when he stated: "The possession--really no
dispute about it" (T. 156).
In sum, none of defendant's cursory attacks on his trial
counsel's performance sustain a genuine claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
PQINT H
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF
PRIOR UNCHARGED CRIMINAL CONDUCT FAIL BECAUSE
THEY WERE NOT PRESERVED AND LACK MERIT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting
testimony of his prior uncharged criminal conduct.

Specifically,

defendant claims that the testimony was irrelevant character
evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Br. at 18-21.

Appellant's

The facts of the case, however, clearly show that

evidence of defendant's prior conduct was admitted only for the
purpose of showing his intent to distribute on the evening of his
arrest.6

In disjointed fashion, defendant appears also to attack

the trial court's ruling under rule 403, Utah Rules of Appellate
6

The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to
exclude evidence is attached at Addendum C.
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procedure, but only as to the court's assessment of the State's
need for evidence of his prior drug distribution activities.
Appellant's Br. at 23-24.

This attack on the trial court's

finding is refuted by how probative the evidence was of
defendant's intent to distribute and how crucial it was to the
State's purely circumstantial case.

Defendant also attacks the

court's ruling on other bases for exclusion referenced in rule
4 03.

Appellant's Br. at 22-23.

However, these claims were not

preserved in the trial court.
A.

Testimony of Defendants Prior Drug Distribution was
Admissible ynder Eyile 404(b) tP Show Iiitent

1.

The Law

Rule 4 04(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
exclusion.

Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion,

not

State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994).

See also State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982) (rule
"has syntax at odds with its substance"); State v. O'Neil. 848
P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993); State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989).

Contra

State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) ("evidence of
other crimes is generally inadmissible").

"Prior bad act

evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being
offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted
in conformity with that character."
18

Q ! Neil. 848 P.2d at 700.

"The admission of evidence under Rule 4 04 is a question of
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness."
Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994) (citing O'Neil. 848
P.2d at 698). "'However, the trial court's subsidiary factual
determinations should be given deference by the appellate court
and only be overruled if they are clearly erroneous.'" Id.
(quoting O'Neil. at 698-99).
2.

Testimony was Properly Admitted to Show Intent

On appeal defendant argues that the sole purpose of the
evidence was to show his bad character and that because he did
not take the stand, "neither [defendant's] knowledge nor intent
were at issue." Appellant's Br. at 19. The second assertion,
that intent was not at issue, is patent nonsense, demonstrated by
both the prosecutor's and defense counsel's acknowledgments
during the motion to exclude and in closing that defendant's
intent was the only issue before the jury (T. 55, 152, 156).7
The first assertion, that the purpose of the evidence was to
show defendant's bad character, is without merit.

It is settled

law in Utah that prior convictions or bad acts related to drug
dealing, if not too remote in time, are admissible to prove
defendant's intent in later committing a similar offense.

See

State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 569-71 (Utah App. 1991) (contested
evidence of identically packaged marijuana was admissible to
establish the defendant's constructive possession of marijuana
7

In pursuing his argument that testimony of his prior drug
activities was admitted only for the purpose of showing his bad
character, defendant argues that evidence of conduct may not be
proved except through prior criminal convictions, citing State v.
Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977). Because character was plainly
not at issue in this case, neither Minnish. nor defendant's
arguments, are relevant.
19

found in mountain cabin, and citing numerous cases from other
jurisdictions admitting evidence of prior drug dealings to prove
intent); O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700-01 (finding evidence of the
defendant's prior drug conviction admissible to show his
knowledge and intent in the present case).
In this case the State was required to prove that defendant
had the intent to distribute marijuana.

Defendant does not

challenge the trial court's finding that defendant provided each
of his three friends with marijuana on separate occasions "within
a short time span before the date in question" (T. 51). The
trial court considered the relevance of these facts under the
broad definition provided in rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence (T.
50-51).8

Given that unchallenged finding and the breadth of the

term ''relevance," the trial court was correct in ruling that the
boys' testimony was relevant to whether defendant had the intent
to distribute marijuana on March 17.
In consideration of the prejudice latent in the admission of
other-crime evidence, however, such evidence must be more than
merely relevant.

"To give meaning to the policy embodied in Rule

4 04(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably necessary and
highly probative of a material issue."

State v. Johnson. 748

P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) (evidence of other crime admissible
because indirectly probative on the issue of identity).
8

Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 401.
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In Taylor, this Court found under rule 404(b) that evidence
of identically packaged bags of marijuana and accounting
materials documenting prior marijuana sales was sufficiently
probative of the defendant's constructive possession of marijuana
in the instant case and crucial to State's case, which was based
only on circumstantial evidence.

Taylor. 818 P.2d at 570.

The prior crime evidence in this case was both highly
probative and crucial to the State's case in precisely the same
way as it was in Taylor.

All three boys testified that defendant

had recently developed a connection with them and thereafter,
within a few weeks before his arrest, provided them with
marijuana (T. 121, 124, 127, 130, 132). Cody Beaumont testified
that defendant had supplied him with marijuana within a week
prior to defendant's arrest (T. 124). Jerry Perez testified that
defendant and he had smoked marijuana, which defendant provided,
at work (T. 130). Scott Clemmons testified that defendant had
sold him an eighth of an ounce of marijuana for $30 to $40 at the
end of January or the beginning of February (T. 132-33) .
It appears that defendant was regularly distributing
relatively small amounts of marijuana to his friends. When
arrested, defendant was discovered with three baggies of
marijuana, all containing relatively small amounts of marijuana
and $58 (T. 74, 83). One of the boys to whom he had earlier
dealt marijuana, Cody Beaumont, was present at the time of the
arrest (T. 121). Based on the similarity between defendant's
past distributions and the scene at the time of defendant's
arrest, all occurring within a few weeks, the evidence of past
acts was highly probative on the issue of defendant's intent.

21

Moreover, the evidence was crucial to the State's case,
which, as the prosecutor pointed out, was purely circumstantial:
when defendant was arrested there was a group of six people, four
of whom were juveniles in his apartment, watching television or
playing Nintendo (T. 71, 122); defendant had some money and three
baggies with small and differing amounts of marijuana in his
pockets (T. 41); various paraphernalia related to smoking
marijuana and scales were found in defendant's closet (T. 96-98);
however, there was some evidence that the scales belonged to
someone else;9 a police officer testified that the discovery of
multiple baggies of marijuana indicated drug distribution (T.
13 6); another police officer who returned to the apartment after
defendant had been arrested testified that WI felt that there
could have been some stale marijuana smoke in there" (T. 109-10);
and a neighbor testified that there was frequent traffic at all
hours of the night into the apartment and that he frequently
smelled marijuana in the hallways (T. 115-18) .
While suggestive, this evidence lacked a critical component,
to wit: testimony or definitive evidence that defendant had
actually distributed marijuana on the occasion of his arrest.

In

fact, Cody Beaumont, the only witness the State called who was
among the group of visitors in defendant's apartment, testified
that defendant had not distributed any marijuana on the evening
of March 17.

Plainly, the State needed evidence of defendant's

distribution activities to convince a jury that what might

9

be a

Officer Erickson testified that a Matt Mandera, also among
the group in the apartment when defendant was arrested, said that
the scales belonged to him. This statement by the police officer
was excluded as hearsay (T. 103).
22

drug distribution scenario in fact was. Testimony of defendant's
past activities supplied that missing ingredient.

In sum, the

trial court was correct in finding the challenged testimony
admissible under rule 404(b).
B.

Defendant's Claim That the State Had Adequate
Alternative Evidence Fails

At trial the prosecutor proposed that in evaluating
defendant's claim under rule 4 03,10 that the court consider
applying the test used in State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292 (Utah
App. 1990). That test, announced in State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d
291, 295-96 (Utah 1988), listed a number of factors useful in
determining the admissibility of evidence under rule 403.1X

10

Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its
probative
value
is
substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 403
11

This is the test:
In deciding whether the danger of unfair
prejudice and the like substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a
variety of matters must be considered,
including [1] the strength of the evidence
as to the commission of the other crime, [2]
the similarities between the crimes, [3] the
interval of time that has elapsed between
the crimes, [4] the need for the evidence,
[5] the efficacy of alternative proof, and
[6] the degree to which the evidence probably
23

On

appeal, however, defendant has apparently abandoned any challenge
to the trial court's overall assessment that the evidence was
more probative than prejudicial, attacking only the court's
implicit finding that the evidence was admissible, in part,
because it was crucial to the State's purely circumstantial
case.12

Appellant's Br. at 23-24.

The sufficiency of the trial

court's ruling on this point has been discussed, above.

See

Appellee's Br. at 20-23 .
Even if this Court were to consider the trial court's
ultimate conclusion that the testimony of the three boys was
admissible under rule 403, applying the facts to the remaining
Shickles factors, it should uphold the court's ruling.

The

strength of the evidence of defendant's prior dealings is based
on the eyewitness testimony of each participant in the prior drug
transaction, the truth of which trial counsel never attempted to
dispute.

State v. Cauble. 563 P.2d 775, 778-79 (Utah 1977)

(admitting evidence of prior crimes for which the defendant had
not been convicted to show intent).

The time interval between

defendant's prior drug transactions and the instant offense
ranged from one week to at most a month and a half.

O'Neil, 848

will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
Shickles. 760 P.2d at 295.
12

Although the trial court did not make an explicit finding
on this point, it is clear that the court incorporated such a
finding in its ruling. The prosecutor very deliberately argued
the State's need to show defendant's intent to distribute through
his prior acts (T. 41-42) , and the trial court inquired about
whether the State had alternative evidence (T. 54), to which the
prosecutor responded (T. 54-55).
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P.2d at 701 (evidence of conviction three years previous not
excessive); Morrell. 803 P.2d at 296 (evidence of robbery one
month prior properly admitted).

The jury would not likely have

been roused to "overmastering hostility" by the admission of the
challenged testimony.

O'Neil. 848 P.2d at "/jl (this Court

refused to believe "that the jury was roused to 'overmastering
hostility' based on a simple drug distribution charge").
Finally, any danger of unfair prejudice was diffused by the trial
court's instruction to the jury, given immediately before the
boys' testimony.

The court very clearly cautioned the jury about

the limited purpose for which they could use evidence of
defendant's prior drug dealing and admonished them that they
could not find defendant guilty of the charged offense if the
State had failed to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, even if
they believed he had committed similar crimes in the past (T.
123).

Based on these facts, the court's admission of testimony

of defendant's past drug distributions under rule 403 was
reasonable.

Olsen. 869 P.2d at 1009 ("A trial court's ruling

based on Rule 403 will not be reversed unless its decision w'was
beyond the limits of reasonability"'") (quoting O'Neil. 84 8 P.2d
at 699, quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah
1992)) .
C.

Failure tQ Preserve Claims for Appeal*
11

[Ordinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an

issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional
circumstances or plain error."

State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309,

1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 580-01 (Utah App.
1992).

"The trial court is considered fthe proper forum in which

to commence thoughtful and probing analysis1 of issues."
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State

v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v.
%Qh,

803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)).

* [To ensure the

trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, appellate review
of criminal cases in Utah requires that "'some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on
appeal."'

State v. Ranag. 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993)

(quoting State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989));
accord State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)."

State

v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 606-07 (Utah App. 1994).
Defendant's motion to exclude evidence was plainly grounded
only on a claim of unfair prejudice stemming from expected
testimony of prior uncharged criminal conduct under rule 4 04(b),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 50-51; T. 40-44).

Defendant

acknowledges that the trial court ruled based on its weighing of
probative value versus unfair prejudice under rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Appellant's Br. at 21.

However, on appeal

defendant claims trial court error based on the other grounds
provided for in the rule, i.e., confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury and needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

Appellant's Br. at 21.

None of these alternative

bases for excluding otherwise relevant evidence, presented at
Appellant's Br. at 22-23, points 1-3, was argued to the trial
court, and, therefore, they are waived on appeal.

Further,

defendant has neither argued plain error nor circumstances.
Therefore, the Court should refuse to consider them.13

13

Even if this Court should consider defendant's ancillary
claims, Appellant's Br. at 22-23, it would find them without merit.
Points 1 and 2 are a rehash of defendant's challenge to the court's
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POINT ITI
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE AS A
PREDICATE TO CHALLENGING THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION
In order to successfully challenge the juryfs verdict the
reviewing court must find that the evidence and its inferences
are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Petree.

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded by rule on other
grounds. Stfrte v, Wfllkey, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). . In
undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the
light most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d

732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).

"[So long as some

evidence and reasonable inferences support the juryfs findings,
we will not disturb them.
(Utah 1985)."

See State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345

Ibid-

To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the evidence
in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing
it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence
is insufficient to support the verdict.

Failure to so marshal

the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of

cautionary instruction, and are rebutted above. Appellee's Br. at
13-15. Point 3 asserts that the court erred in failing to give the
jury an instruction on how remote evidence should be weighed.
Appellant's Br. at 23. Defendant provides no authority undermining
the trial court's implicit finding that Jerry Perez's and Cody
Beaumont's smoking marijuana provided by defendant only one or two
weeks prior to defendant's arrest was not remote. Further, the
court buttressed its finding in noting that Cody Beaumont was
present when defendant was arrested (T. 53).
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insufficiency considered on appeal.

Mincy, 838 P.2d at 652 n.l

(citing Moore. 802 P.2d at 738-39).
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant
argues:

that Cody Beaumont, the only person present at the time

of defendant's arrest and who testified at trial, did not know
that defendant was in possession of marijuana; that Matt Mandera
told investigating officers that he owned the scales found in the
apartment; that the baggies contained only small, uneven amounts
of marijuana; that defendant's prior drug transactions took place
two and three weeks prior and that the search of the apartment
was not based on reasonable suspicion or carried out with a
search warrant.
Plainly, defendant has not marshaled any evidence in support
of the jury's verdict, and this Court should decline to consider
his claim of insufficient evidence on that ground alone.

Indeed,

much of the evidence he offers in rebuttal is either irrelevant
to the analysis or insufficiently set out.

Particularly,

evidence that Mandera owned the scales was stricken on the
State's hearsay objection (T. 103). Officer Goodwin testified
that the discovery of multiple baggies indicated that the
marijuana was for distribution and that the small and various
amounts might well have resulted from the common practice of
"pinching," i.e., taking some of the packaged product for
personal use (T. 137-38).

Cody Beaumont testified that he had

smoked marijuana provided by defendant within only one week prior
to defendant's arrest (T. 124).
In sum, not only has defendant failed to marshal the
evidence, he has also inaccurately set out evidence in support of
his claim.

Further, based on the facts presented to the jury,
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Appellee's Br, at 3-6, there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's verdict.
PQINT XV
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SUPPLY AN ADEQUATE
RECORD ON APPEAL TO PERMIT ASSESSMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO REDUCE DEFENDANT'S
JUDGMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to
grant his motion to reduce his sentence. Appellant's Br. at 2526.

However, the lack of an adequate record prevents this Court

from considering defendant's claim.
The Utah Supreme Court has often refused to consider claims
founded on an inadequate record.

See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d

1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct.
751 (1990); State v. Steggell. 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983).

In

State v. Garza, this Court similarly refused to consider a
defendant's appeal from the denial of her motion to suppress
where she had failed to supply the Court with a transcript of the
hearing on the motion to suppress.

State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937,

938 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
The Court's decision was bolstered by the defendant's failure to
include a statement of facts in her brief.

Id. at 939. The

Court held that without an adequate record uwe must assume, as a
matter of law, that the trial court's decision was not
erroneous."

Id. at 938.

The same circumstances pertain in this case.

Defendant

moved for a reduction of his sentence following trial (R. 150).
The motion fails to mention any grounds in support of the
request.

Evidently, the motion was heard and denied on July 19,

1994; however the minute entry fails to disclose the grounds for
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the trial court's ruling (R. 149). The record is devoid of
anything that could assist this Court in reviewing the trial
court's ruling.

Moreover, defendant has failed to cite any part

of the record that would support his claim.

Indeed, his

factually unsupported argument is similarly unsupported by any
legal authority.

Ami cone.

684 P.2d

at

1344.

Therefore,

because

defendant has failed to provide any record that would allow this
Court to meaningfully review the trial court's ruling, the Court
should decline to consider his claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised
in this case, th§ State does not request oral argument.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this > ?

day of February, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence
All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence
(a) General provision. The requirement of
authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims.

Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an
appeal in a criminal case may move the court
to remand the case to the trial court for the
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant
to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The motion shall be available only
upon an allegation of facts constituting
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully
appearing in the record on appeal. The
motion shall be filed prior to the filing of
the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of
good cause, the court may permit a motion to
be filed after the filing of the appellant's
brief. In no event shall the court permit a
motion to be filed after oral argument.
Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court
from remanding the case under this rule on
its own motion at any time if the claim has
been raised and the motion would have been
available to a party.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

Another person's intent, being a state of mind, is seldom
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence and must
ordinarily

be

inferred

from

acts,

conduct,

statements

and

circumstances. You are the final judges as to the person's actual
intent as shown by these factors.

INSTRUCTION NO,

13

In every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint operation of the
act and intent. The intent or intention is manifest by the circumstances connected with the
offense and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.
A person is only guilty of an offense when his conduct is prohibited by law and
he acts with some kind of criminal intent, that is, he acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
as the definition of the offense requires.

••Distribute" means to deliver other than by
administering or dispensing a controlled
substance or a listed chemical.
"Distributor" means a person who distributes
controlled substances.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\3~

In these instructions certain words and phrases are used
which require definitions so that you may properly understand the
nature of the crime charged and apply the law as contained in these
instructions to the facts as you may find them from the evidence.
These definitions are as follows:
A person engages in conduct "intentionally or with
intent11 or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct or
cause the results.
A person engages in conduct "knowingly, or with
knowledge" with respect to his conduct or to the
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.
A person acts "knowingly, or with knowledge" with respect
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
"Possession" means the joint or individual ownership,
control, holding, retaining, maintaining, or obtaining of
controlled substances, and includes individual, joint or
group possession of controlled substances. For a person
to be a possessor of a controlled substance, it is not
~required
that he be shown to have individually possessed,
c
*D *y%or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if J&ULL^
^vidau^ct. i^ shows that he jointly participated with one or more
persons in the possession or control of any substances
with knowledge that the activity was occurring.
You are instructed that marijuana
substance under Utah law.

is

a

controlled
^
^,*

You are instructed that one ounce equals SVBStiSS? grams

ADDENDUM C

39

1

closed, we'll appreciate that.

2

We'll be in recess*

3

Counsel, can I see you in chambers briefly.

4

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

5

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court

6

and counsel in chambers out of the hearing of

7

the jury, which was reported as follows:)

8

THE COURT:

9

convened in chambers.

Let's go on the record.

We're

It's now two minutes after 11:00.

10

Present are myself, the court reporter, the clerk, the

11

transportation officer with the defendant Mr. Kacsuta.

12

Also defense counsel, Mr. Christiansen, and counsel for the

13

State, Mr. Kanell.

14

The purpose of our meeting in chambers and out

15

of the presence of the jury and witnesses is to discuss a

16

motion which was made yesterday by Mr. Christiansen to

17

exclude certain portions of the State's intended evidence.

18

And that relates to evidence of prior criminal activity

19

which is uncharged in this case. We discussed it briefly

20

yesterday, and I said I would treat it as a Motion in

21

Limine.

22

before he makes his opening statement to the jury, which

23

we're about to hear.

And Mr. Kanell has asked that we resolve that

24

I'll hear any evidence or argument —

25

arguments you wish to present at this juncture on whether

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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any

1

or not that evidence should be excluded.

2

MR, CHRISTIANSEN:

Well, I suppose that it's my

3

motion, and so I'll begin•

I really don't have anything to

4

add from yesterday.

5

pointed out in my memorandum —

6

crimes is not admissible.

7

And as the Court pointed out yesterday, even in the Rules

8

of Evidence, the —

9

exception.

The general rule seems to be —

as

that evidence of other

Granted, there are exceptions.

the matter of intent can be an

But I think that the reason to apply the

10

exception has to be clearly made.

11

is that if the jury hears of other misconduct, then they

12

might acquire the concept that the defendant is a —

13

lawless type person, and whether he's guilty of the thing

14

he's being tried of today or not, he's guilty of something,

15

so we better take this opportunity to —

16

of something so the Court can punish him.

17

this —

18

The reason for the rule

a

to find him guilty
So I think that

they could be prejudicial.
And the reason for them —

for admitting them

19

has to be strongly relevant, I think.

And in the cases

20

that I anticipate in this case —

21

Perez, the Beaumont boy — whoever —

22

supposedly smoked with — marijuana with the defendant on

23

some prior indications, doesn't really indicate that he's

24

in the —

25

it doesn't apply to the marijuana that was found on his

the Clemmons case, the
people who may have

in the business of distributing.
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1

person.

And so all that they —

they would be would be

2

prejudicial against him.

3

show anything affirmative that would be worthwhile.

And you're right.

It would not

4

Thank you.

5

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kanell?

6

MR. KANELL:

7

the evidence relevant.

8

clearly relevant.

9

I think the first question is is
And I think in this case, it's

And the second, the evidence is —

10

THE COURT:

the second

Just so the record is clear maybe

11

you can tell us what evidence we're talking about and why

12

you feel it's relevant.

13

MR. KANELL:

—

Okay.

I would like to state the

14

specific evidence that I understand, and the way it's going

15

to come in.

16

Count I that's charged ~

the State has the

17

burden of proving the element that the defendant had the

18

intent to distribute the marijuana.

19

difficult thing to prove, because evidence of a person's

20

state of mind is kind of difficult to prove.

21

that we have that would show that is that he was

22

unemployed, and he had some money in his —

23

and that he had three baggies of marijuana containing

24

various quantities of marijuana in each baggie. And

25

that's —

And that's a fairly

But evidence

in his pocket,

I don't think there's any problem admitting

PAULO. MnMTILLIN
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1

that.

That's clearly relevant and admissible.

2

But then we also would have evidence from his

3

neighbor that there was a lot of traffic going back and

4

forth from his apartment, and that —

5

testify that at times, he smelled the odor of marijuana

6

coming out of the apartment*

7

complained to the landlord about the traffic.

8

that's relevant and admissible.

9

to do with the intent to distribute, with people coming to

10

I'm not sure. He may

And he testified that he
I think

And it does have something

the apartment.

11

The evidence that we're dealing with now, I

12

think, is evidence that will come from Scott Clemmons, Cody

13

Beaumont and Jerry Perez.

14

that they understood that the defendant was in the business

15

of distributing marijuana either for money or for

16

friendship with his friends. He provided marijuana and

17

allowed them to smoke it, or he sold them marijuana.

18

that —

19

act that is a crime if it were proven —

20

uncharged crime, because we haven't had the actual drugs

21

that were involved or the ability to charge those.

I think they each will testify

And

those are, of course, evidence that his prior bad
that it is an

22

And the reason that we need to ~

to present

23

that evidence is because that's our basic theory of the

24

case, is that the defendant was basically running a

25

business —

an operation where he was selling marijuana,
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and he was distributing it to friends.

That's our basic

theory of the case.
And as I said before, in analyzing that
evidence, the first question is whether that would be
relevant.

And I think it's clearly relevant to our theory

of the case. The second is it's also clearly evidence
of —

of prior bad acts,fcrtiichif it were entered just to

show that the defendant is a bad person because he's done
bad acts, or he has a bad character so he should be guilty,
then that would be improper.

But we would specifically be

offering the evidence under Rule 404(b), that it's evidence
of his state of mind and his intent that he had marijuana
and —

and intended to distribute it.
And once —

if the Court rules that that is

evidence of his intent, then the Court has to go to Rule
403, which is the rule dealing with a balancing of
interest, to decide whether the relevance of the-evidende
outweighs the possibility that the evidence will prejudice
the jury and make them hostile towards the defendant, or in
other words, that the prejudice over —

outweighs the

relevance.
I think it's the State's burden to prove that
it's relevant and to prove that it's evidence of intent,
and that then when the judge makes that balancing act, I
think that the judge —

it's the defense's burden to show

PATTT CI

MnMTTTTTXT

1

that it would create hostile —

2

outweigh the relevance.

or that the prejudice would

3

That's the way I understand the law.

4

THE COURT: All right.

5

MR. KANELL:

And in the state of —

And

—

in the case

6

of State of Utah versus Kenneth Jamesfforrell,the Court of

7

Appeals analyzed Rule^04(Jb) with that regard, and they —

8

they listed factors that are helpful in balancing

9

probativeness and prejudice.

And it says that the —

in

10

deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice in a case

11

substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a

12

variety of matters must be considered, including the

13

strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other

14

crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of

15

time that has elapsed between the crimes, a need for the

16

evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof and the degree

17

to which the evidence probably will arouse the jury to

18

overmastering hostility.

19

And then it goes on to say that in that

20

particular case, they decided that the State had a great

21

need to present the evidence to demonstrate intent and how

22

effective alternative proof was available.

23

deal with the —

24

almost identical fact situations, so it was —

25

good evidence of intent in that particular case.

And that would

with the two types of robberies that were
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feel that that evidence is critical to our case.

It shows

his intent.
And, in fact, there's another analysis under
Bule 404(b) that has to do with the doctrine of chances.
And I think that's relevant to us.

In other words, if the

defendant is going to argue that this is just personal use,
we would argue that he's had marijuana so many times in the
past that he's distributed and —

to others, that to say

"Well, this one time he just was going to do it for
personal use" —- we feel that that evidence is important to
contradict that to show that it's unlikely, because the
probability of —

that he was going to use this for

personal use, when he's always distributed it in the past,
is unlikely.
THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Christiansen?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yes.

On the matter of

relevance, Your Honor, I don't feel that any of the items
mentioned by Mr. Kanell show that this evidence is
relevant.

The fact that he —

that the defendant was

unemployed and had $58 or some amount in his pocket
unemployed people still have to eat.

—

I don't think that he

has some money in his pocket means anything.

It just means

that he's not totally broke. And certainly it means even
with that amount, that that —
drug business.

that doesn't justify a — a

Because the drug business produces greater
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1

amounts of money than that.

2

that way.

3

If that's to be considered

The other is that in these three bags, they had

4

different quantities. And I guess I interpreted that

5

different than Mr. Kanell, but I would think that if these

6

bags are packaged for sale, that they would have the same

7

amount in them.

8

show, had point four of a gram.

9

there up to four plus grams, I believe it was.

I think one of them, the evidence would
And then it went from
And if he's

10

going to have it for sale, the —

11

same.

12

that he used for his own purpose. He'd taken some out of

13

one and some out of another.

14

the amounts would be the

And I think this indicates that these are just bags

And then I think the fact that there is such a

15

small amount here —

16

there's such a small amount.

17

business of distributing, that he would have more than

18

that.

19

irrelevance.

20

considering all three bags together,
That —

So I think the small amount indicates, then, an

Well —

and again, I won't repeat what I've said

21

about the prejudicial part of it.

22

THE COURT: All right.

23

MR. KACSUTA:

24

THE COURT:

25

that if he's in the

Mr. Kacsuta.

I think that part is —

Sir. May I say something?
You can talk to your attorney,

I can't discuss anything with you.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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(Discussion off the record,)
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
part of —

Well, unemployment may be a

what he's saying is the unemployment may be a

fact in dispute.

Personally, I don't see that it's a fact

at all, where he has $58 in his pocket.

I also mentioned

that it did not have any probative value at all whether
he's employed or unemployed.
THE COURT: Well, just so I'm clear,
Mr. Christiansen, is it your motion to exclude the
witnesses only of —

the testimony of the three witnesses

who are going to testify about prior distributions by
Mr. Kacsuta?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yes. Those three.

If that's

all that they're going to be using.
THE COURT:

So you didn't —

you're not moving

to suppress the evidence about the $58, are you?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay. Also, Mr. Kanell, you said

something about having your witnesses testify that they
understood that Mr. Kacsuta was involved in drug
distributions.
MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:
MR. KANELL:
I said —

Well

~

That seems to —
It started out with Mr. Clemmons.

you know, I asked "Do you use marijuana?

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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M

2

"During the time around March 17th of —

3

Yes.
of

1994, did you know where you could obtain marijuana?

4

"Yes.

5

"Who could you obtain it from?"

6

And he mentions the defendant and a couple other

7

people who —

8

friend.

9
10
11
12

the defendant# his brother, and another

All three of those people were in the apartment
at the time the officers came.
THE COURT:

Okay.

ask the question?

13

MR. KANELL:

14

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

15

being hearsay, anyway.

16

MR. KANELL:

17
18

Is that the way you intend to

Yes.
Well, I'd object to that as

Based upon his knowledge of where

he could obtain marijuana.
And then I would like to ask him "How do you

19

know that?" And he will say, "Well, I purchased marijuana

20

from Jared Kacsuta."

21

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Christiansen, do you

22

want to respond to that issue?

It's a slightly different

23

issue, it seems to me. His testimony about his —

24

purchase of marijuana from Mr. Kacsuta &eferly *omes within

25

the rule under 404(b).

His statements of what he

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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1

understood t h e r e p u t a t i o n of Mr. Kacsuta cu L

2

i i i f I e t i-11 in1!1 iih 11 i u r .
KRm

3

well, I don't think it's a

KANELL:

4
5

a — his personal knowledge of
iere r>e could buy marijuana.
f

THE

™ saying

that WP need to analyze that highly differently than we did
about his actual purchasing,

PCIIISI

11

i'. iiie „ it lias to <lo more with -his reputation,
10

character,.

Those are the kind of analyses "

K-

CHRISTIANSEN:

C £ course evidence of

elieve

. inadmissible.

we're talking about character, II
THE COURT"

'"

Nik11, KANELL1.

,

°~ '*

id be inadmissible.
.'I all/.

I t ' s the same I s s u e ,

1L goes Lo

ills intent.
T

THE COURT:
MR. KANELL
zu

11

1 "111

' — ^our pardon?
:t goes t o t h e defendai • "'

oil Hi »"

veuh.

t a l k i n g about h i s character
1,

1 1 c i> f iM

„ )

in'r'il ,

Bun t then a r e n ' t ^uu r e a l l y
He's been a rinirj d e a l e r i n
( 1 i 1.1 In, (, ii

I

ling to

drugs here. And that really is his character rather
actual •
MR. KANELL:

"r#

*- offering it for his
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character, I'm just offering it for the fact that he —

his

intent at the time was that he was going to distribute
drugs.
THE COURT: And I think evidence by an
individual that they had, in fact, purchased drugs close in
time to the ~

to the time of the possession has some

relevance on that.

I'm not sure that their opinion of his

general character or his general involvement in the drug
trafficking trade fits into the same category, from an
analytical point of view.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

I think another matter, Your

Honor, is that this charge would be possession of —

of

this marijuana with intent to distribute this marijuana.
And the small amount that he has.

If we're talking about

an instance two or three weeks before that, it seems to me
that it doesn't indicate an intent to distribute this small
amount.

He may have had another amount, but I think where

the amount was so small, the —

well, there is no

carry-over.
THE COURT: Well, let me first —

let me rule on

the matter.
The first question I agree with Mr. Kanell is
the question of :T«lSR%aic§. And under 461, £ "relevant
evidence11 means evidence tiaving any tendency to make the
existence of any ~fafct that Is of consequence to the
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d e t e r m i n e I I n n nl

I In

i'u I n HI IIII H I

2

than i_ would be without t h e e v i d e n c e .

|H

nl< i l l I HI

I

|H i h i l l ' 11

3
4

and certainly the evidence from other persons that they had

5

',,',11,11, ,', f,l, M

6

purchased or obtained marijuana from Mr. Kacsuta is

7

relevant.

8

clear relationship to the issues in this case as tu wtial.

9

his intent was in possessing that marijuana on March 17th.

in

11

It —

I mi: • | -,i, Iffmr Mn1 '•'vt-r MI question

it certainly raises a clear

or hv-< a

sn thp relevance, I think, is clearly shown.
Under 404 (b), the State is entitled to introduce

12
13

It's not precluded by the Rules of Evidence.

14

precluded by the general rule th

Christiansen cited

15

in his motion yesterday. But thert

a process of

16

balancing which the Court must go through to determine

17

whether this otherwise .olevant evidence should be

18

admissible evidence

19

It's not

^nd that's where the real difficulty
>mes in.

20

Because undoubtedly, when you introduce before a

21

charged with the responsibili / oi determining

22

whether the defendant intended to distribute the marijuana

23

that he possessed evidence that he has on three different

24

occasions prior to that distributed marijuana to other

25

persons, there's a clear danger that their focus will be
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shifted from ±he crime that they're considering here today
to the crimes that the State claims he committed but are
not charged in this event —

in this case.

So there's —

there's always the possibility of unfair prejudice to the
defendant under these kinds of circumstances.
The question is whether or not that unfair
prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of the
evidence.

And I think to determine that, you have to

analyze each item of evidence separately and then look at
those items collectively as they relate to the issue.
For example, the testimony of the witness who
testified —

who is going to testify, as I understand it

from what we —

was said yesterday, that he had purchased

marijuana two to three weeks before March 1.7th "from
Mr. Kacsuta.

If that were the only testimony the State

were seeking to introduce, I would probably find that its
probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant, standing alone.
some concern, two to three weeks.
other evidence.

The time is of

It's unsupported by any

Obviously it has some probative value, but

not a lot as to what Mr. Kacsuta intended to do on March
17th with the marijuana in his pocket.
stand alone in these —

But it does not

in this case. We have Mr. Perez,

who is going to testify what, Mr. Kanell?
MR. KANELL:

I think it's around one or two
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weeks before, i

Kacsuta provided him with marijuana. $md

they .smoked it together,
COURT:

Okay.

So r

two weeks before March 17th, »r

rvacsutc

ui i i i involved in distributing

is4 :bating marijuana.

And we have two ^ r s ,
And tuwu ~~ * -

^u testify.

K- Beaumont.

MR. KANELI

.c iy Beaumont,

apartme

March the 17th.

He was ii i the
He had just
im.ii n in

barely gotten there, and he had — >••

defendant had provided in the pas 1 , hv \ I think
r *• |rs one 01: two weeks.
THE COURT:

right.

So

have three

different persons w>

* iJiree-week

period before March 17th, Mr* Kacsuta had distributed
marijuana

has ~ is clearly

clearly highly probative of Mi Kacsuta's intent o.. II.'
c

especially where

is presen~

, t apartment with other peuj . n

this arrest o c ^ r in

Mr.

* - lose individuals

and the -- and the marijuana is found

Va^eiyfc*

It'

close process

~ determining whether +**

anfair prejuc
the final step,

probative value,
think, is to look ...i, the State's r
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the evidence and the availability of alternative proof to

2

establish the defendant's intent.

3
4

What alternative proof do you have to show his
intent?

5

MR. KANELL:

Well, the alternative proof that we

6

have is the fact that he had some money on his person.

7

could have been used -- he could have collected it from the

8

people in the apartment and is — when they were all

9

sharing the marijuana.

Or were going to.

He —

10

been complaints to the landlord.

11

traffic —

12

And that's all we have as alternative evidence.

13

It

there had

There had been foot

traffic *-- frequent foot traffic going to that.

THE COURT:

The normal process —

or the normal

14

way that one proves the intent to distribute is to call an

15

expert witness and have them testify as to the amount and

16

the packaging and those kinds of items.

17

Do you have any such evidence in this case?

18

MR. KANELL: Raymond Goodwin is willing to

19

testify as an expert witness about the packing amounts,

20

foot traffic, and that those things are indicative of

21

distributing drugs.

22
23

THE COURT:
alternative means?

24
25

So you do have an effective

MR. KANELL:
It's —

I don't know if it's effective.

it's additional.

It's part of it.
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THE I 1111 III1 II , lu his testimony goinn *•« K ^ * K at
one who possesses a small quantity of marijuana divided up
three uneven bags is indicative

I" itie intent to

distribute?
I

difficult,

.f

distributing.

testify is

The amounts

somewhat troubling,

but he's goinc „u testify that often

e

distributing, they're -^'-^hing amount
^r* * *-• *

taking part

~

themselves or

, a^u

F<~

*n* wni _

mounts
I mean that's

to distribute it,

-z when

^u-

UWUGXJ.^

^rrerent.

they're going

it they would all be quarter ounce

baggies
THE COURri

-- . -

ear on the record,

Mr. Christiansen, you agree that the intent OL uie
defendant with regai.

*e marijuana that was found in

lis pocket is the-pivotal issue in this case; is that

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
unawss

UXroe.

Jt changes

THE COURT:

Yi"..,
iiiiiiii

li I he first ur.m I
l

i in i .rlmmi-Mii

All right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

x think just
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i I i

1

him and such small distributions as that may not really be

2

relevant of the type of intent the statute is talking

3

about.

4

THE COURT:

Well, I think that's exactly what it

5

is relevant to.

I think that the statute prohibits sharing

6

marijuana with your friends even if it is in small

7

amounts.

8

it doesn't have to be distributed for any ~

9

particular quantity.

And it doesn't have to be distributed for value;
in any

Distribution includes giving it away

10

or allowing somebody to take a hit off your cigarette just

11

as surely as it does selling a brick of marijuana.

12

think there's relevance.

13

So I

Well, I'm going to determine and I do determine

14

that although there is clear danger of unfair prejudice,

15

that the probative value of the evidence outweighs that ~—

16

that danger.

17

they are to regard any evidence of prior illegal conduct

18

only as it relates to the intent of the defendant on the —

19

on the day charged.

20

that it will be totally improper for them to find him

21

guilty of the offense with which he's charged just because

22

they may believe that he may have committed that offense in

23

the past and was not charged.

But I do intend to instruct the jury that

And I'm also going to caution them

24

Do you understand that?

25

MR. KANELL:

Yes.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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THE COURT:

e

T

~

"

i 11 i I" it cautionary instruction,.
And T* LI ULA, HI Kane 1J

1

instruction for me to give to the jury at

you

intend to produce this evidence, okay?

I o decide?

MR. KANELL:

Okay.

'in 1 ( I'i>iin

INI

11 il IK 111

iiiiivi h i

e l s e we need

And with regard to the testimony ^ the

mi 1 1 e MI

r —

their .knowledge x>r their opinion

that Mr, Kacsuta was involved in the drug trafficking,
11I'I

nt-the motion to suppress that evidence.

So

would be improper for you t« **'
u

an opinion
U A

opinion tha

*.

•

salesman.

/

relate t

ntent 1

stribute marijuana and
u Q W h e ther

lie

a drug
Anythina ^x&c we need to discuss at this
point?
MR. KANELI

<6V

ni

01

i l l i ml In mi mi

n
i i mi in1,,,11 In

Have we s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d

THE COURT:

issue

.
w

~

statements and proceed

wi th th-. :: . a l ?
M R , . K A N E L I ,1

I think s o , Your Honor.

PATTT.fJ M r M U L L T N

